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Abstract
The present paper analyzes an example of International Trade between two 
countries in a model of spatial competition "a la Hotelling". The central as­
sumption of the example is that national buyers face a uniform national price 
while foreigners pay delivered prices on imported goods. An equilibrium price 
configuration, when it exists, involves different mill prices in the two 
countries : the smaller the country, the smaller the mill price. Furthermore, 
for a price equilibrium to exist, countries must be of different size. Finally, 























































































































































































Recently, it has been recognized that a significant portion of internation­
al trade develops in imperfectly competitive markets. Evidence of the interest 
in this aspect of international trade theory can be found in numerous papers 
which have been recently published in this area (see, for instance, Brander and 
Spencer [1982], Caves [1979], Jacquemin [1982], Krugman [1979], Lancaster [1980], 
Rieber [1982]; fora survey of the literature, see Dixit [1984]).
In the present paper, we expand in particular on the role of transportation 
costs on international trade in a regime of imperfect competition. More precise­
ly, we are concerned with the problem of analyzing international trade between 
two countries in a model of spatial competition. It is generally observed that 
no price discrimination can be practiced within the national market by a local 
firm, while different delivered prices are set on the foreign market. A car 
Fiat is paid by a dealer the same price at Palermo and Torino, while a higher 
price is paid by a customer of the same car in Paris than Marseille. There are 
several possible explanations for this asymmetry between national and foreign 
delivered prices; one is provided by the fact that the citizen of a country do 
not bear the transportation cost while foreign customers do. National distribu­
tion facilities, or legal prohibition of price differences across different na­
tional regions, can in turn explane this advantageous treatment provided to the 
national customers over the foreigners.
Our analysis stems out from this assumption, so that a citizen of a given 
country places his purchase order to the national firm, irrespective of the 
distance to that firm, if and only if the home (mill) price is less than the 
foreign price plus the transportation cost for importing the product. This 
choice rule for the customer has to be contrasted with the arbitrage prevailing 
in classical spatial competition models where firms compete within a given 
country : there consumers buy from the firm which sets the smallest delivered 
price. This difference has important implications in terms of spatial and price 
competition on the international market. As we shall see in the example treated 
in the present note it may introduce fundamental asymmetries in trade between 
countries. First a price equilibrium on the international market can exist only 
if national firms quote different (mill) prices. Second international trade 
must necessarily flow from the smaller to the larger country. Third, for an 
equilibrium to obtain on the international market, it may be necessary that a 
significant asymmetry exists between the sizes of the two countries.
These assertions are established in this paper for a particular model di­



























































































(Hotelling [1929]). More precisely, we assume a linear market representing two 
adjacent countries. In each country is located a single firm producing an homo­
geneous good at no cost, and we study the resulting noncooperative price equi­
libria in the exchange between the two countries. The model is outlined in 
Section 2, the equilibrium analysis is provided in Section 3, and the results 
are briefly commented in Section 4.
2. THE MODEL
To represent the two adjacent countries, we choose a model "a la Hotelling" 
where the population of buyers in countries 1 and 2 is spread uniformly over a 
line [0,L] , where country 1 includes all buyers in [0,F] , while country 2 
includes all buyers in ]F,L] . In each country there is a firm producing a 
homogeneous good : they are located at respective distances a and b from the 
ends of this line (a £ [0,F] , b £ ]F,L] , a + b ^ L ;  a ̂  0 , b ^ O ;  
cfr Figure 1).
I--- 1---L
0 a F b L
Figure 1
Each buyer purchases exactly a single unit of the commodity, either from his 
home firms, or by importing it from the firm located in the other country, 
beyond the border F . We assume that the unit price to be paid by a citizen 
of a particular country is uniform within the country. On the contrary, if the 
product is imported, the buyer has to pay the transportation cost from the 
foreign firm to his home, in addition to the price set by the foreign firm.
The transportation cost is linear in distance. Formally, letting t denote a 
particular customer in country 1, t £ [0,F] (resp. country 2, t £ ]F,L]) , 
t will buy from his home firm, if and only if
pl <  P2 + c(L -b -t)
(resp. p2 <  Pj + c(t -a)) , where Pj and p^ denote the prices set by firm 1 
and 2, respectively, and the scalar c denotes the transportation cost per unit 
of distance. Given (Pj,P2) the set of customers placing their purchase order 
at firm 1 is given by




























































































[o , Min |f ,P2 - p i + C(L - b )•|] U j F , Max {F , Min |-
p2 - p } +ac
-}}]
Similarly the set of customers placing their purchase order at firm 2 is
jt £ ]F,L] | p2 <  pj + c (t - a) | U jt t [0,F] | Pj >  P2 + C(L _b -t)} »
or
Max
f P9 -p,+ac-| r f fp -p +c(L-b) i|F f -- 1----j f Lj u |̂Min jF f Max -------------, o| ,
Let us define p̂  as the solution of the equation
p -p + ac 
F = ^ ----  ■
i.e. pj = p2 - c(F-a) : if seller 1 sets a price exceeding pj , given p2 , 
no customer from country 2 would still import from firm 1. Similarly, define 
Pj as the solution of the equation
p2 ~Pi + c(L-b)
i.e. Pj = p2 + c(L -b -F) : if seller 1 sets a price exceeding pj , given p2 , 
some customers from country 1 are now importing from country 2. Notice that 
Pj <Pj when L - b ^  F , as it is assumed. Hence in the domain [pj ,Pj] , 
demand addressed to firm 1 remains totally inelastic to Pj > an^ consists of 
the whole national market, i.e. demand is equal to F . In an analogous way, 
we can define p2 = Pj ~ c(L-b -F) and p2 = Pj + c(F-a) , and demand addres­
sed to firm 2 remains equal to L - F in the domain [p2 , p2] .
We are now in a position to derive the (contingent) demand functions to 
firm 1 and 2, respectively. We have
f P2 -Pi+aclD(p1,p2) = Min |L , ---- -----j , if 0 <  Pj <  p2 - c(F - a) ;
= F ,if p2 - c ( F - a ) * S p j ^ p 2 +c(L-b-F)
p -p +c(L -b)
= ------ -------  , if p2 + c ( L - b - F ) < p j < p 2 + c(L-b);
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D2(pi»P2) = Max |L » L “
p2 “ pi + c(L ~b)-j , if 0 <  p2 <  pj - c(L -b -F)
= L - F
= L
p2 ~ pj + ac 
c
= 0
, if pj - c(L -b -F) <  p2
<  Pj + c(F - a) ;
, if pj + c(F -a) <  p2
<  Pj + ac ;
, if pj + ac <  p2 .
Figure 2 describes Dj(ppP2) as a function of p̂  •
Figure 2
The revenue functions of the firms, corresponding to these contingent demand 
functions write as Rj(pj,p2) = p} • DjCpj.p^ and R2(pj,p2> = p2 • D2(pj,p2> , 
respectively. We notice that both demand and revenue functions are continuous, 





























































































3. THE EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We are interested in characterizing a noncooperative market outcome on the 
international market, i.e. a pair of prices (p*,p*) such that no firm can 
profitably deviate from p? , i = 1, 2 . To this end, assume that (p*,p*) is 
a price equilibrium, and define the following domains :
D11 = {pj | p£ + c(L -b) >  pj >  p* + c(L -b - F) j
d12 = {pj I P^ + c(L -b -F) >  pj >  p* - c(F -a) j
D13 = |pj I P2 ~ C(F _a) >  Pt ^  •
In an analogous manner, define
° 2 1 = { P2 I P * + ac >  p2 >  p * + c (F  -  a ) j
D22 = {p2 I p* + c(̂F >  P2 >  P* ~ C(L -b -F)}
D23 = { p2 I PT - c(L -b -F) >  p2 >  oj .
The graphs of the demand functions D^(pj,p*) and D2(p*»P2) > and tbe corres­
































































































If a price equilibrium (p*,p*) exists, it is defined by
p* = j (L + a) , P2 = ~~'2L3— —  (equilibrium of type I), 
or by p* = (L + b) , p* = C^ L— (equilibrium of type II) .
Proof : The proof of the proposition proceeds by eliminating various domains of 
price pairs which are not admissible as price equilibria. First no price equi­
librium can obtain with p* £ and p* € 1)̂ 2 • Indeed, since demand is
inelastic to price in the corresponding range for each firm, revenue maximiza­
tion in implies that p* = p| + c(L-b -F) , and revenue maximization in
D2J implies P* = P* + c(F -a) ; these two implications are clearly impossible 
together. Similarly, no price equilibrium can occur with p* £ Djj and
P* ^ °22 (°r t*ie symmetric case : P*  ̂D j2 » P* ̂  °2l^ ! w^en ^2  ̂^22 *
must be equal to p* + c(F-a) , so that p* ^  P* » contradicting the fact that
p* € Djj . Furthermore, an equilibrium (p*,p*) with p* £ Djj and p* £ D2J , 
or p* £ and p* £ D22 » is also impossible for obvious reasons. We must
finally exclude the case where p| £ Dj^ and p* £ D22 (or the symmetric case :
p| £ and p* £ ^23) • In that case, it must be that p| = P* + c(F-a) ,
so that p* = p^ - c(F-a) t » a contradiction. Consequently, we are left
with the only possibilities : (i) p* £ and, simultaneously, p^ £ D2J ,
and/or (ii) p* £ j and, simultaneously, p^ £ •
In case (i), since the pair (p*,p*) is assumed to be a price equilibrium, 
the prices p* , p* must solve simultaneously
,p* - Pj + acN
Max 
P1eDl3
/P2 - pr ac\




(l - -.2 ' pJ * ! c)
Since and D2j are both semi-open intervals, the pair (p*,p*) can be an
equilibrium only if the prices are interior to Dj^ and D2J , respectively. 
Accordingly, first order conditions must be satisfied, which imply that 
p| = -j (L + a) and p* = -c— — —  (equilibrium of type I).
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Max
PleDll





p2 -p* + c(L -b)>
’ P'
Since D11 and D22 are semi-open intervals, the pair (p*,p*) can be an
equilibrium only if the prices are interior to D^j and » respectively.
Accordingly, first order conditions must be satisfied, which imply that
* _ c (2L -b)p* = j (L + b) and pï (equilibrium of type II).
□
We notice that an equilibrium of type II is simply an equilibrium of type I 
where a has been replaced by b . In the following, we study equilibria of 
type I, but everything which is said about these equilibria applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to equilibria of type II.
To obtain a type I-equilibrium, it must be that p* belongs to the interior 
of , and p* to the interior of D21 ’ in turn implies p* <  p* .
The last inequality can hold only if a < £• . From this we infer immediatelyL  ̂ lthat if F ̂  y  , any location of firm 1 in the interval [y , F] is not compa­
tible with the existence of an equilibrium of type I (a similar reasoning applies,
mutatis mutandis, to equilibria of type II if F <  y) . Consequently, we must
 ̂ Lrestrict ourselves to a-values strictly smaller than -r- in the analysis of
 ̂ Lequilibrium of type I (resp. of b-values strictly smaller than — in the anal­
ysis of equilibria of type II).
PROPOSITION 2
No equilibrium of type I (resp. type II) exists if country 1 (resp. coun­
try 2) is larger, or equal to country 2 (resp. country 1).
Proof : Assume that (p*,p*) is an equilibrium of type I with F S5 j and
a . Then Rj(p*,p*) = g . If firm 1 chooses a price p̂  = p^ , it
c. ( 2L_cOrealizes a revenue Rj(p*,p*) = F • — -—  --- . Direct comparison shows that
Rj(P$»P$) >  Rj (p*,P*) » 3F(2L - a) >  (L + a) 2 .
Since a must be strictly smaller than y , all values of F larger or equal 




























































































against p* , a contradiction to the fact that (p|,p*) is an equilibrium of 
type I.
□
Proposition 1 implies that if an equilibrium exists on the international 
market, it is never autarkic : the country setting the smallest price exports 
to the other. Proposition 2, in turn, says that there must be an asymmetry in 
the sizes of the countries for an equilibrium to exist on the international . 
market. Moreover at equilibrium, it is always the smaller country the one which 
exports to the larger. A further implication of Proposition 1 is that, since 
both Dj (p*,p*) = L ̂  a~ and p* = cCL * a) are increasing with a , so is 
Rj(p*(a) , p*(a)) in the domain of a-values where an equilibrium of type 1 exists; 
therefore firm 1 will locate as close as possible to the border in this domain. 
This reflects the fact that firm 1 exporting to country 2, tries to approach its 
customers located beyond the border1. In fact, when a price equilibrium exists 
on the border F , then firm 1 will find it advantageous to locate on the border. 
This "attraction property" is interesting to study, to the extent that it is 
often observed, in countries with an important foreign trade, that industries 
cluster towards their neighbours markets (good examples are provided by Italy 
or England). In the following it is our purpose to derive an example where this 
attraction property is fully realized within our model. In other words, we show 
that there exist values of F such that if firm 1 locates at F , a price equi­
librium of type I exists. To this end, we take the particular case b = a , as 
on Figure 5.
0 a = F b L
Figure 5
PROPOSITION Z
Let F = a = b . Then the set of F-yalues for which there exists an equi­
librium of type I is non-empty.
Proof : If Lemma 1 (see appendix) is satisfied, then the price
q / 2jj “ ci) •is a best reply against p* = --- -̂--  if, and only if,
n* = c(L + a) P1 3
1 The same incentive does not appear for firm 2, since its profits at an equi­
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V P Î ’ P*} >  V P2 + C(L " b “ F) » P*} * O )
Substituting for b and F , (1) holds iff
c(L + a)^ ca(5L - 7a)
9 ^ 3
or - 3aL - 20 a ^  0 , or iff
^  13 - L\/249 
< --- -40--- def
For these values of a , the condition of Lemma 1 is satisfied so that, if 
a ̂  p* , p* is a best reply against p| for firm 1 .
To show that p* is a best reply against p^ for firm 2, first notice 
that Lemma 2 is also satisfied for all values of a ̂  p* . Furthermore, we are 
left with the comparison of I^Cp*,?*) with R2^P* » P* + c(F-a)) = **2 P̂*,pIp  
since F = a . From direct comparison, we get
R2(p|,p|) = c(2L - a) ' 9
^ c(L + a) 
3 (L - a) = R2(P*»P*)
if L >  y .
□
Three conclusions can be drawn from Proposition 3. First, it shows that 
the "attraction property" can hold : the exporting firm optimizing its location 
sets up its plant next to the foreign market. Second, in the example considered, 
a striking asymmetry in size between the two countries is needed for observing 
an equilibrium of type I when the small country firm locates optimally on the 
border. Finally, Proposition 3 provides, as a byproduct, an example where a 
price equilibrium exists on the international market for the model we have con­
sidered, giving content to Propositions 1 and 2.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have here described a suggestive example of the manner in which trans­
portation costs for exports, when they are borne by foreign customers, may in­
fluence international trade. The central feature of this example are that 
national buyers face a uniform national price while foreigners pay delivered 




























































































We have shown how competition between rival firms located in different 
countries operates when this asymmetric pricing rule is used. In particular, 
mill prices in both countries must necessarily be different at an equilibrium 
in the international market, which cannot occur if countries are of the same 
size. Furthermore, in equilibrium, when it exists, international trade always 
flows from the smaller to the larger country, and the exporting country has the 
lower mill price. The intuition behind this asymmetry lies in the fact that 
the firm in the larger country has a sizeable local market, and does not find 
advantageous to lower its price for attracting foreign customers, while the in­
verse holds for the firm in the smaller one. Finally, the exporting firm is 
"attracted" towards the border, approaching thereby its foreign customers, but 
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Let — —  and a = b = F < j ; then, either
V P j , Rj(f (L + a) , p*) > Rj(Pj,p*) ,
V Pj , Rj(p* + c(L - 2a) , p*) >  Rj(pj,p*) •
Proof : In any case if a price Pj verifies the property : 
v Pj , RjCppP*) > R j(Pj,p*) ,
it must be that pj , after substitution for b and F , is solution of either 






/ P2 ~ P1 ac\
V---- c---- ) ' pl *
/p* -Pj +c(L - a)\
V------------------- C---------------- j  • p l ’
(1)
(2)




where D jj , and Dj ̂  are defined as in Proposition 1. First, let us
show that if a <  y , as supposed, the solution Pj to problem (3) must lead
rsj #to a revenue Rj(pj,p*) which exceeds Rj(pj,p*) for all pj m  Djj >~ #leaving us with either case (1) or (3). First, it is clear that Pj solution 
of problem (3), is equal to p^ + c(L - 2a) , that is : Pj = -j (5L - 7a) . On
the other hand, the solution pj - say - to problem (2) is easily derived as
pj - f (5L - 4a) .
Since the inequality a <  j implies that pj <  Pj , the concavity of Rj(pj,p*) 
in the domain Dj j ensures that R j(Pj>P*) ^  Rj (p^ + c(L-2a) , p^) for all 
Pj £ . On the other hand, an easy calculation shows that Pj = j (L + a) is






























































































c(l + a.) L
Let —̂ ~ i and assume a = b = F <  -j . Then either,
V p2 , r2(p* , --(2l3~ a)) >  R2(p*,p2) ,
or V p2 , R2(p*,p*) >  R2(p*,p2) •
/v/
Proof : In any case, if a price p2 verifies the property :
V p2 , R2(p*,p2) >  R2(p*,p2) ,
it must be that p2 , after substitution for b and F , is solution of either 
/ p -p*+c(L-a)s
Max (L - ------- • p (1)
P2£D23 ' 1
/ P2 "  Pf + ac\or Max I L ----------- ) • p„ , (2)
P2eD2I V ' '
or Max (L - a) • p2 , (3)
p2eD22
when D21 , D22 and D23 are defined as in Proposition 1. Let us show that,
if a < i. , the solution p„ to problem (3) must lead to a revenue R~(p?,p9)
2 1 1 1 1 which exceeds R2(p*,P2) for all p2 £ D23 , leaving us with either case (2),
or case (3). First, it is clear that p2 solution of problem (3) is equal to
p* + c(F-a) = p* (where the last equality follows from F = a) , so that we have
necessarily that
R2 ̂ P*»P*) ^  R2 » P* “ c (L “ 2a) ) •
It is therefore sufficient to show that R2(p* » P* -c(L“ 2a)) ^  R2(p*>P2) for
all p2 £ D23 . Since R2(p*,p2) is concave in the domain D23 , the last
inequality must hold if the unconstrained solution p2 to problem (1) exceeds
c(L + 43.) • Jp* - c(L - 2a) . An easy calculation shows that p2 = --- -̂--  , which exceeds
p* - c(L-2a) if a <  -j . On the other hand, it is easy to verify that ̂  ̂ Xj
P2 = T (2L “ a) is solution to problem (3) when a < -j , which completes the 
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